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Comments
SEC and FRB Treatment of Options: An
Experiment in Market Regulation
George Lee Flint, Jr.
After five years in the planning stage, the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE), on April 26, 1973, commenced operation for a
pilot period.' The CBOE, the nation's first exchange devoted exclu-
sively to options trading and the first to trade options since the passage'
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 potentially represents the most
significant development in the securities industry since the introduction
of mutual funds. The genesis of a new investment market capable of
generating new commissions for the brokerage industry,4 coupled with
the CBOE's early success in attracting investors, 5 has interested several
national exchanges-most notably the American Stock Exchange and
the PBW Stock Exchange.6  The CBOE's debut has also attracted the
1. Berton, Options Trading: A Booming New Market, FiNANCIAL WoRLD, June 20,
1973, at 25. The Chicago Board of Trade approved in principle the formation of an
affiliate options exchange in October 1971. Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1971, at 4, col. 4. The
Securities and Exchange Commission approved the registration of the options exchange
on February 1, 1973. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9985 (Feb. 1, 1973),
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. jl 79,212.
2. See Gates, The Developing Option Market: Regulatory Issues and New Investor
Interest, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 421, 421-31 (1973).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq. (1970).
4. See The Big Action in Options, DUNs, Oct. 1973, at 57.
5. Prior to the creation of the CBOE, the Put and Call Brokers and Dealers As-
sociation sold at most four thousand contracts per week in the over-the-counter market.
Berton, supra note 1. During October 1973 alone, CBOE trading nearly equalled over-
the-counter volume for all of 1972. Option Plays Are Spreading, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22,
1973, at 104. By March 1974 volume on the exchange averaged 16,800 contracts per
day. Laing, New Game in Town, Wall St. J., April 22, 1974, at 1, col. 6. The CBOE
achieved this spectacular record despite a declining market. Id. In the rising market
of May 1975 the CBOE's volume reached 63,000 contracts per day. Wall St. J., May
14, 1975, at 21, col. 1. Such a large increase, however, falls far short of the New York
Stock Exchange's volume of 250,000 100-share blocks traded daily.
6. Option Plays Are Spreading, supra note 5; Turov, New Look in Calls, 53
BA.RON'S, Aug. 6, 1973, at 9. The SEC has recently permitted the American Stock Ex-
change to engage in options trading. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,144
(Dec. 19, 1974), [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. 80,034 (1974). The PBW
Stock Exchange received tentative approval to begin options trading on June 1, 1975.




attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), both of which Congress has ordained
to protect the investor and assure a fair market.
7
The development of a substantial options market poses special
risks to investors and to the securities market." Failing to understand
the market mechanics, the investor risks encountering more precipitous
losses in options than in other securities trading. Furthermore, both
the instability of options prices and the dislocation of credit reserves
caused by heavy speculation in options threaten other securities
markets. To protect the investor and ensure a climate of fairness and
economic efficiency, both the SEC and the FRB have recently moved
to curb the unfavorable effects of options trading. The SEC, having
perceived the posture of options trading in the larger securities market
and its particular suitability to experimentation,9 has fashioned a num-
ber of innovative and potentially far-reaching proposals. It has
promulgated rule 9b-l, 10 describing the SEC's power to formulate rules
for options exchanges; proposed rule 9b-2,11 pertaining to disclosure
and suitability requirements for options trading; and proposed rule
238,12 providing an exemption from options registration. The FRB,
meanwhile, has modified its margin requirements to make certain that
options have no loan value,13 purportedly to prevent misallocation of
the nation's credit reserves. This comment evaluates the wisdom and
effectiveness of the agencies' recent custodial drmarche.
I. The Mechanics of Options Trading
The two fundamental types of options, 4 the call and the put, grant
the holder the right to purchase (call) or sell (put) the underlying
stock at a specified price, the striking price, at any time within the con-
7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970).
8. See Proposal to Adopt Rule 9b-l, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
9930 (Jan. 9, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 1646 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. I[ 79,171.
9. E.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,552 (Dec. 13, 1973), [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 79,604.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1 (1974).
11. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2, 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED. SaC.
L. REP. 1122,623 (1973).
12. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5444 (Dec. 13, 1973), 39 Fed.
Reg. 1283 (1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RPt. 79,602.
13. 12 C.F.R. § 220.126 (1975).
14. For discussion of options investment strategies, see B. MALKIEL & R. QUANDT,




tract period. The striking price usually approaches the underlying
stock's market value at the time of the sale of the call or put.
The capital outlay for options investing is much less than the
requisite investment for trading in the underlying stock, in that the
price paid for the option, the premium, typically equals only a small
percentage of the striking price. Suppose, for example, that the price
of the underlying stock for a call with a ten percent premium rises from
a $100 striking price to $150. The stock trader buying at $100 and
selling at $150 would realize a profit of $50, or fifty percent (excluding
commissions15). The call buyer, however, buying the option for $10,
executing it when the underlying stock reached $150, and subsequently
selling the stock at $150, would realize a profit of $40, or four hundred
percent. Thus, the options buyer commits much less capital than the
purchaser of common stock, and yet gains the opportunity for con-.
parable profits. Investor interest stems chiefly from these leverage
benefits of options trading.
Unfortunately, leverage works two ways; the options buyer may
lose his entire investment if he cannot exercise his option profitably.
Had the stock in the above example declined from $100 to $50, the
call buyer would have lost his $10 investment; he would surely have
chosen not to exercise the call, because so doing would have com-
pounded the loss. A stock trader, on the other hand, retains the stock
and the hope that someday its price will rise enough at least to cover
his investment.
In contrast, the options seller, or "writer," often a wealthy
individual, seeks to capitalize on these purchasing risks by selling op-
tions that the buyer will not likely exercise. Options writing mitigates
the writer's risk of loss from downturn in the market price of the under-
lying stock, because the premium amount is guaranteed as a minimum
return. In a declining market the amount of the premium reduces the
writer's paper loss; in a rising market the writer's gain is limited to
15. Commissions on options trading approximate those involved in trading other
securities. For a trade involving $100 to $799 the options commission would be 1.3%
plus $12 whereas the minimum stock commission on 100-share orders would be 2.0%
plus $6.40; for a trade involving $800 to $2499 the options commission is 1.3% plus
$12 whereas the stock commission is 1.5% plus $15; and for a trade involving $2500
to $4777 the options commission and the stock commission are both 0.9% plus $22.
Compare Chicago Board Option Exchange Clearing Corporation, Prospectus, at 28
(April 26, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Prospectus], with 29 STANDARD & POOR'S CORP.,
SECURITY OWNER'S STOCK Gurma, April 1975, at 254.
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the premium amount.16 Generally, options writers reap greater profits
than options buyers,17 in that writers realize a return regardless of stock
fluctuations.'
Prior to the organization of the OBOE, investors traded options
in complicated and awkward fashion via the over-the-counter market."9
Lacking a central exchange, brokers advertised by newspaper and word
of mouth.20 In search of the lowest premium, the customer's broker
canvassed various options dealers, thereby increasing the overhead
cost.2 ' Poor communication also meant that in almost every case the
writer wrote each option contract anew, 22 with little attention paid to
previous options' valuations. Options prices lacked uniformity, and
few, if any, were interchangeable; the climate was wholly unsuitable
for the survival of a secondary market. The options buyer could profit
only by exercising the option and compelling the writer to fulfill the
contract by relinquishing his interest in the stock.
Through its subsidiary, the Chicago Board Options Exchange
Clearing Corporation (CBOECC), the CBOE now intervenes between
writer and buyer, issuing the options itself. The writer thus contracts
directly with the CBOECC,23 whereas the buyer, instead of looking to
the writer for performance, looks to the exchange subsidiary as the
options issuer. The CBOE has also eliminated the overhead cost and
nonliquidity problems of the traditional options market by standardizing
contracts, 24 making them freely interchangeable, so as to facilitate the
16. Snyder, Puts and Calls, CoM. & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, May 8, 1969, § 2, at 43.
17. Chicago Board Options: Under Water?, 112 FoRBEs, July 15, 1973, at 66; see
C. ROSENBERG, STOCK MARKEr PRRAER 118 (1974).
18. See Gates, supra note 2, at 422.
19. Id. at 426-32; see Anderson, Chicago Options, 27 Bus. LAw. 7, 9 (1971).
The options markets cannot yet trade puts and can only trade calls for a limited
selection of underlying stocks. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9985 (Feb. 1,
1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. 79,212, at 82,670
(CBOE); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,144 (Dec. 19, 1974), [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP'. 80,034, at 84,800 (1974) (American); Wall St. J.,
March 21, 1975, at 4, col. 2 (PBW). Investors therefore still trade numerous calls
and all puts over the counter.
20. Berton, supra note 1, at 26.
21. Anderson, supra note 19, at 9.
22. See Gates, supra note 2, at 427.
23. Prospectus, supra note 15, at 22.
24. The CBOE has standardized options by requiring that the option periods, the
longest of which may be nine months, must uniformly end on the last day of April, July,
October, or January. Over-the-counter options carry comparable restrictions; however,
these periods may end on any date upon which the writer and buyer agree. In addition,




establishment of a secondary market. The secondary options market
has stimulated enormous interest, because purchasers may now realize
profits without paying the stock's option price. Furthermore, they pay
substantially lower brokerage commission fees on the premium amount,
rather than on the purchase-sale of the stock itself.25 As a further sec-
ondary market advantage, the writer may withdraw from the market
simply by purchasing the same type of options he has written.
Before interest in options trading awakened, government regula-
tion had waned. During the 1920's the option became a manipulators'
tool. Options served to ensure a cheap stock supply and spur activity
in a single security, usually by circulating rumors designed to increase
or decrease the price.26 These practices generated such intense public
concern that an early draft of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
banned options altogether.27  The put and call brokers then organ-
ized,28 and replied by emphasizing such options' benefits as writers'
guaranteed premium returns. In response, Congress simply prohibited
certain nonoptions manipulative devices29 and authorized the SEC to
make necessary options rules. 0 Prior to the organization of the CBOE,
the SEC never exercised that power;"1 instead it acquiesced in self-
$10 for one valued between $50 and $100; and $20 for one valued over $100. Berton,
supra note 1, at 27. There is usually only one striking price per underlying stock, but
if the market price exceeds a multiple, a writer may offer a second option for the same
period at a new striking price. High Leverage in New Option Exchange, 39 FINANCIAL
WORLD, Feb. 28, 1973, at 7. The underlying stock must appear on the New York Stock
Exchange with a minimum price of $10, and must have traded in volume of at least
one million shares for each of the two preceding years. The corporation itself must is-
sue a minimum of ten million shares and list 10,000 shareholders. Berton, supra note
1.
25. Berton, supra note 1, at 26.
26. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S.
REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-55 (1934); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, FEDERAL SECUPrIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9, 17 (1934); HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECU-
,rrmis EXCHANGE BILL OF 1934, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, 21
(1934).
27. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a)(9) (1934), reprinted in 11 J. ELLENBERGER
& E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973).
28. B. MALKIEL & R. QUANDT, supra note 14, at 12.
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1970). Prohibited
devices included (1) wash sales and matched orders of securities, (2) the illusion of
active trading to induce others to trade, (3) the technique of disseminating information
that a stock will fluctuate in order to induce a trade, (4) methods of spreading false
information, and (5) price fixing by artificial transactions.
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b)-(c) (1970).
31. In its first two years the SEC held conferences and conducted studies to de-
termine the extent to which it should allow option trading. The Commission investi-
1247
Texas Law Review Vol. 53:1243, 1975
regulation by the Put and Call Brokers and Dealers Association."
II. SEC Authority to Regulate Options Exchanges
When the CBOE proposed to register as a national securities
exchange, the SEC theorized that the novelty of options trading, its
complex problems and its special risks to the investor warranted a
departure from usual registration procedures permitting exchanges to
initiate their own rules.13  Certain securities operations under the tradi-
tional regulatory scheme had degenerated somewhat,34 and, confronted
with a nascent market devoid of entrenched institutions, the Commis-
sion may have considered the moment propitious for assuming a more
aggressive and definitive role in exchange regulation. Implementing
its authority to classify exchanges35 and promulgate protective options
exchange rules,3 6 the SEC adopted rule 9b-1, 37 delegating to itself the
gated trading practices, registration of options dealers, reports concerning the granting
or acquiring of options, the duration of options, and endorsement of options by exchange
members. 2 SEC ANN. REP. 15 (1936); 1 SEC ANN. REP. 16 (1935). The SEC never
adopted any rules, however, adjudging its other antimanipulative weapons sufficiently ef-
fective, and declining to further hamper legitimate options usages. 3 L. Loss, SacU-
RrrIES REGULATION 1544 (2d ed. 1961). The Commission has conducted studies of op-
tions from time to time in conformity with its responsibilities under sections 9(b) and
9(c) of the 1934 Act, the most recent and notable study having been conducted in 1961.
27 SEC ANN. RPP. 67 (1961). Because section 9(b) only forbids conduct contrary to
SEC rules, the absence of any SEC-promulgated options regulation might preclude a vi-
olation of the statute. See In re Harold T. White, 3 S.E.C. 466, 535-37 (1938).
32. B. MALKIEL & R. QuANDT, supra note 14, at 12. The New York Stock Exchange
adopted rules that had been drafted in contemplation of the passage of the Securities
Exchange Act: each member who knew about a substantial option trade relating to
listed securities had to file a report; no specialist could deal in options based on the
underlying stock in which he was registered; no member could deal in options on the
floor; and no member could initiate, on the floor, an options deal in which he had an
interest. 3 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 1545 & n.49.
33. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg.
1646 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. % 79,171. The new
procedure would allow close supervision of the CBOE during its experimental stage.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,552 (Dec. 13, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 34,665
(1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sc. L. REP. 79,604. The SEC did
not intend to alter other exchanges' self-regulatory schemes, but merely decided that op-
tions exchanges required closer regulation. Id.
34. The SEC had recently failed to evoke voluntary adoption of an exchange rule
requiring that members conduct a large percentage of their business with the public. See
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 3902
(1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,178.
35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970).
36. Id. §§ 9(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b)-(c).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1 (1974). Rule 9b-1, in relevant part, states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for a national securities exchange. . . to effect any
transactions in an option . . . except in accordance with a plan . . . that is
declared effective by the Commission ....
(1) Before an exchange . . . may effect any transaction in options . . . the
1248
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power to initiate an options exchanges regulations. Rule 9b-l pro-
hibits a national exchange from trading in options without prior
submission of a plan to the SEC so that interested parties can respond.
The Commission may then require the exchange to "alter, amend,
supplement, or rescind" the submission."' The plan must include the
exchange's "regulations, rules, by-laws, constitutional provisions and
other requirements" concerning options,39 and must also detail methods
for clearing transactions, regulating members who trade for their own
account, endorsing options, reporting transactions, and listing trading
privileges.4" The 9b-1 requirement raises three questions: whether
investors need the protection the SEC seeks to provide through the
rule; whether the rule will prove effective in regulating options
exchanges; and whether the SEC had the authority to enact rule
9b-1.
Investors do require the protection the SEC seeks to provide by
rule 9b-1. The threat to investors that necessitated section 9 of the
exchange shall propose and file with the Commission a plan regulating trans-
actions in options on the exchange....
(2) The Commission shall give prompt notice of any proposal filed by an ex-
change to alter, amend, supplement, or rescind a plan in effect. . . and the
proposed change shall become effective upon the 30th day after notice has been
given by the Commission . . . unless the Commission shall disapprove the
change ....
(3) . . . Ihe Commission may require that an exchange alter, amend, sup-
plement, or rescind its plan . . . to the extent that the Commission finds to
be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
(4) The Commission may take action under any provision of this paragraph
(a) without notice and opportunity for interested persons to submit written
data, views or arguments.. . for good cause ....
(b) Plans. . . shall contain... the regulations, rules, by-laws, constitutional
provisions and other requirements of the exchange that relate solely . . . to
transactions in options on the exchange, and shall include provisions relating
to-
(1) effecting transactions in options on the exchange by members thereof for
their own account and the accounts of customers;
(2) the clearance or settlement of transactions in options;
(3) the endorsement and guarantee of performance of options;
(4) the reporting of transactions in options; and
(5) the listing and delisting of, and the admission to and removal of trading
privileges on the exchange for, options ...
The rule became effective on January 17, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 1261 (1974). The
original proposal would have only indirectly regulated exchange rules by forbidding
members to trade on noncomplying exchanges. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 10,397 (Sept. 21, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 26,943 (1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. RPp. 79,517.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-l(a) (3) (1974).
39. Id. § 240.9b-1(b).
40. Id.
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Securities Exchange Act,41 coupled with recent failures in self-regula-
42sionotion procedures, urge the imposition of permanent safeguards. More-
over, options trading has captivated a virtual throng of neophytes,
intent upon plotting a nickle-and-dime course to glorious fortune.43
Absent SEC intervention, these novices could suffer financial de-
vastation at the hands of unscrupulous dealers; furthermore the price
instability resulting from widespread, careless investment could injure
legitimate investors' interests. 44
The SEC presently protects investors in traditional equity securi-
ties by allowing exchanges voluntarily to adopt rules consistent with the
Exchange Act. 45  Although the exchanges independently self-regulate
in lieu of SEC review,46 the Commission can revoke an exchange's
registration upon violation of the Act or a regulation. 47  Moreover, the
Commission may alter or supplement exchange rules only on specified
statutory grounds and only if the exchange fails to comply with an SEC
request.48 The SEC also requires the reporting of any rule changes,
but, because a failure to report does not affect the validity of any ex-
change rule,49 the requirement is virtually impotent. In the past the
Commission has refrained from actively tampering with particular rules
of exchanges that typically complied voluntarily with SEC sugges-
41. See materials cited note 29 supra.
42. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 3902 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,178.
43. Maidenberg, "Calls" Get Big Play on Exchange in Chicago, N.Y. Times, Sept.
2, 1973, § m, at 13, col. 1 (unsophisticated investors have been attracted to options
trading); see N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1974, at 34, col. 2 (SEC Commissioner stated gambl-
ing is motive of options traders); see also Wall St. J., May 23, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (return
of small investors to options market after bear market). But see N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1975, at 51, col. 2 (CBOE study indicating that investors in options are highly sophisti-
cated group). Such conflicting characterizations of the options market may result from
the different perspectives from which the various observers view regulation.
44. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg.
1646 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 79,171.
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1970).
46. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 1171-73.
47. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1970).
48. Id. § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b). The specified grounds include (1) safeguards
with respect to exchange members' financial responsibility, (2) limitation of the trading
of stock for a certain period after issuance, (3) listing of stocks, (4) hours of trading,
(5) solicitation of business, (6) fictitious accounts, (7) settlement of accounts, (8) re-
porting transactions of the exchange, (9) fixing reasonable rates, (10) minimum units
of trading, (11) odd-lot trades, (12) margin accounts, and (13) similar matters. See
e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 1646
(1973), t1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,171.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-8 (1974).
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tions. 0 More recently, however, the Commission has proposed in-
creasingly radical innovations, such as the "institutional membership"
rule51 and fully negotiated commissions,52 and has either failed to ob-
tain voluntary compliance,53 encountered widespread industry resist-
ance,54 or stumbled over formalistic delay tactics. 5
In this context, the SEC's decision to formulate new rulemaking
procedures for options exchanges was necessary and sensible. Under
the auspices of the Administrative Procedure Act,5" the SEC em-
powered itself to amend exchange rules rapidly.57  Given the novelty
of options and their unknown effect on the securities market, the SEC
must utilize that power, often to the point of subitaneous intervention
in exchange affairs, so as to counter the pedestrian pace of self-regula-
tion, preserve the status quo of market constancy, and expedite the
evaluation of experimental results. Furthermore, lessons gleaned from
initiating options trading rules will assist the Commission in devising
an alternative to the cumbersome voluntary rulemaking procedures
currently governing traditional exchanges.
In response to the second question-whether rule 9b-1 will, in
fact, prove effective-the SEC may have failed to reserve the authority
necessary to regulate options exchanges properly.58 Rule 9b-1(a)(3)
applies only to an exchange's initial plan: the language merely pro-
hibits options trading before SEC approval of the plan.59 Apparently,
50. Cf. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 3902 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. I 79,178.
51. See PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 734 n.3 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
52. Address by Ray Garrett, Chairman of the SEC, ABA 56th Nat'l Trust Con-
ference, Miami Beach, Florida, Jan. 28, 1975, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1 80,085 (1975).
53. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 3902 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 79,178.
54. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1975, at 47, col. 4.
55. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,552 (Dec. 13, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 34,665 (1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,604.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1(a) (4) (1974).
58. Effective rulemaking also includes the capability of designing rules that work.
This would include whether the SEC possesses sufficient manpower to carry out the
necessary investigations; however, the SEC currently relies upon a review of options ex-
changes' plans for the needed information.
59. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-l (a) (2) ("rescind a plan in effect"), with id. §
240.9b-(a) (3) ("rescind its plan"). The absence of the phrase "in effect" in rule 9b-
1(a) (3) indicates that the exchange rulemaking power of the Commission applies only
to a plan not yet in effect. Rule 9b-1(a) (2) does allow the Commission to regulate
an exchange's alteration of its own options rules.
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stock exchanges may still adopt rules consistent with the Securities Ex-
change Act in the wake of the Commission's declared intent not to sup-
plant the self-regulatory exchange functions.60 By the terms of rule
9b-1 (a) (2), however, the SEC may supervise any modifications made
by the exchange after the Commission's approval of the initial plan.
Yet the language arguably authorizes subsequent supervision by the
SEC only in the face of affirmative, amendatory action by the exchange,
thereby suggesting that the Commission would be powerless to inter-
vene spontaneously and enforce modifications in the exchange's experi-
mental plan. Clearly, however, the SEC interprets the rule differently
and envisions a more active supervisory role. 61 To preclude an
unfavorable judicial interpretation, the SEC could simply amend the
rule, molding the language to a precise articulation of the Commission's
intent.
Yet the question remains whether the SEC has authority to prom-
ulgate such a rule. Even with a clearer rule, the SEC must answer
the contention that section 19 of the Exchange Act,62 which delineates
SEC powers over exchanges and securities, overrides and restricts the
Commission's power to alter an established exchange's rules.63 Under
section 19, the SEC formerly claimed the authority to promulgate ex-
change rules when deemed necessary for the protection of investors.
14
Ensuing litigation failed to resolve the authority issue and failed also
to establish a test for the validity of the investor-protection claim. The
SEC had wielded rule 19b-265 as its vehicle for requiring that all
regulated exchanges adopt rules conditioning exchange membership on
willingness to serve the public.66 In PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v.
60. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,552 (Dec. 13, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg.
34,665 (1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,604.
61. The SEC shall have the "opportunity to comment upon all proposed plans and
proposed changes in effective plans." Id. The SEC ". . . may by order require the
adoption, amendment, alteration, or rescission of any rule of a national securities ex-
change. . . ." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 1646 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,171.
Speculation as to the efficacy of the rule as envisioned by the SEC is only tentative at
this time and does not obviate the need to compare the literal wording with the Commis-
sion's apparent intentions.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)-(b) (1970).
63. Cf. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 969 (1974).
64. Id.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1974).
66. The rule dictates that a member must conduct eighty percent of his transactions




SEC,6 7 plaintiff exchange attacked rule 19b-2, contending that Con-
gress, in passing the Securities Exchange Act, denied the Commission
rulemaking power by deleting the authorization 68 from the bills final
version.69 The PBW Stock Exchange further argued that the SEC had
no power to alter or supplement an established exchange's rules, except
as provided in section 19, which purports to safeguard investors rather
than brokers.7 0  The Commission responded71 by quoting section 23(a)
of the Act, which states that the SEC may "make such rules and regu-
lations as may be necessary for the execution of the functions" author-
ized by the Act.7 2  Although the Supreme Court has held that com-
parable clauses in other acts grant broad powers,"" the PBW court
never resolved whether the SEC can supplement an exchange's rules,
inasmuch as it dismissed the petition on jurisdictional grounds.74  Thus,
the third question-whether under section 19 the SEC had the authority
to enact rule 9b-l-remains unsettled, and, because it invades a province
once reserved to exchange members, the authority issue may spur further
litigation.
Rule 9b-1 will likely not fall to a PBW-type attack for several
reasons. First, the SEC has yet to establish a fully nonexperimental
options exchange;75 thus, there are no powerful institutions intent upon
protecting their income sources through litigation, as in PBW.76 Sec-
ond, the rule purposes to protect investors, a goal that conforms with
the general aims of the Exchange Act; rule 19b-2, however, was
67. 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974), noted in 52
TEXAS L. REv. 1014 (1974).
68. H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 18(c) (1934).
69. Brief for Petitioner at 24-26, PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d
Cir. 1973). In so arguing, petitioner attempted to frame rule 19b-2 as merely an admin-
istrative order.
70. Id. at 20-21, 28-33. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19, 15 U.S.C. §
78n (1970). Rple 19b-2 protects brokers by providing increased commission from insti-
tutional investors who must now trade as members of the public.
71. Brief for Respondent at 34, PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d
Cir. 1973).
72. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970).
73. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1953); ac-
cord, Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969); United State& v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-78 (1968); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
390 U.S. 747, 787 (1968).
74. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 969 (1974). The court abstained from reviewing the merits of the case because
a "regulation" rather than an "order" was involved.
75. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9985 (Feb. 1, 1973), [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,212, at 82,670.
76. Options trading has gained in attractiveness, however, and a number of these




designed to aid brokers. Third, the SEC will likely exercise the power
only in important actions, in light of the present staff's reluctance about
policing several options exchanges as opposed to one central ex-
change.7 7  Fourth, unlike section 19, which grants limited rulemaking
power T7 section 9(b) authorizes the SEC to formulate any options-
related rule necessary to protect investors. The Commission, however,
would likely prefer to sustain its affirmative rulemaking role on a basis
broader than section 9(b): only section 19's general provision will
support extension of the aggressive approach beyond options, to stock
exchanges generally.
III. SEC Information Requirements
One of the SEC's primary objectives is to ensure that investors
have suitable access to risk and financial information, so that they may
make knowledgeable, rational decisions whether to invest in the highly
risky undertaking of options trading. To achieve this end the SEC
possesses two methods-requiring registration of options under the Se-
curities Act,7 9 and regulating options trading under the Securities
Exchange Act. 0
A. Present Options Information Requirements
Current SEC rules temporarily permit the utilization of an infor-
mation system for options similar to that used for other types of securi-
ties trading, i.e., registration of the securities, presentation of a
prospectus, and delivery of the certificate.81 Options registration poses
two questions: does the SEC possess the authority to require such
registration, and, if so, what should be the nature and extent of dis-
closure required?
The SEC probably does possess the authority to require options
registration. Before the CBOE begat the options craze, the SEC had
never required registration of puts and calls, because it did not recog-
nize puts and calls as "securities" under the Securities Act.8 The se-
77. Id.
78. The SEC has not abandoned the idea that section 19 of the Securities Exchange
Act grants exchange rulemaking power similar to that of section 9. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973'), 38 Fed. Reg. 1646 (1973), [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1[ 79,171.
79. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2) (1970).
80. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970).
81. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2) (1970).




curities acts include within their definition of a security a "right to sub-
scribe to or purchase a security, ' 83 a definition that should encompass
the call,8 4 and the SEC now requires their registration .8  A more dif-
ficult question is the SEC's authority to regulate puts. Recently the
SEC has indicated that it intends to treat puts as securities also. In
defining the expression, "equity securities," in rule 3all-1,88 the SEC
included puts for "the purpose of clarity. t87  One federal court, in
holding that a put does qualify as a security, seized upon the rule's lan-
guage, to facilitate the finding of a fraud violation.88 Little opposition
to the inclusion of options within .the security definition has evolved,
because even if the term "security" does not include options, the SEC
can still require options registration by formulating a rule under section
9(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which authorizes the Commission
to make whatever options rules it deems appropriate to the public in-
terest.89
Options registration poses a fundamental problem: should de-
tailed disclosures be required, and to what extent? The SEC has not
provided options registration forms, nor has it acted to enforce registra-
tion. 0 The Commission has also yet to determine what information
the issuer should include in the registration, although its approval of
83. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). The "security" definition
was intended to be the same in the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. See
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FEDERAL SEcURTEs EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934). But see 1 L. Loss, supra note
31, at 479.
84. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
af'd in part, rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969) (stock option is a security).
85. Dean Witter & Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
78,602. A registered broker desired to assist in call option writing without registering
and requested a no-action position from the SEC. The Commission determined that,
absent an exemption, call options could not be sold to the public without registration,
but it did not pass on the nature or extent of disclosure necessary. Id. See generally
1 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 469.
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1974).
87. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9929 (Jan. 29, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg.
11,449 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,196.
88. Vogel-Lorber, Inc. v. Options on Shares, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,911 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970).
90. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5444 (Dec. 13, 1973), 39 Fed. Reg. 1283
(1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,602. The Commis-
sion has, however, encouraged inquiries into what kinds of disclosures would best serve
registration of puts and calls on current forms. See Dean Witter & Co., supra note 85.
See also Gates, supra note 2, at 438.
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the CBOECC prospectus offers an indication of the SEC's posture.
The CBOECC, which issues and endorses 91 CBOE options, devotes
most of its prospectus to risk and financial data concerning options trad-
ing in general, referring only vaguely to information about the underly-
ing stock. 2  Several reasons explain the SEC's acquiescence in not
specifying the information desired. Although the buyer has a special
interest in the underlying stock, especially its price volatility, the issuer
of the option may not be in a practical position to supply such informa-
tion. As an outsider, the issuer has ready access only to published
sources, the accuracy of which could not be verified.93 Moreover, price
volatility information becomes crucial to the purchaser when he deals
in "down-side-out" calls and "upside-down" puts.9 4  In those cases, the
SEC suggests disclosure of market fluctuations over -appropriate time
periods. 95 Finally, the option writer should not have to perform the
buyer's research and market assessments for him. 96
B. Proposed Options Information Requirements
Increased options activity and its incidental risks have prompted
the SEC to propose rule 9b-2,97 which mandates more effective dis-
91. An endorser obligates himself to the buyer to deliver the underlying stock upon
exercise of the call.
92. Id. at 13-14.
93. Gates, supra note 2, at 438-39. This information would be readily obtainable
if the underlying stock were registered. See Prospectus, supra note 15, at 13.
94. Gates, supra note 2 at 439. These expiration price options involve a special
risk that makes price volatility a major concern in triggering expiration. For regular
options, however, the purchaser will gain as long as he exercises the option at a profit-
able point.
95. In re Goldman, Sachs & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. S c. L.
REP. 78,159.
96. The Commission properly recognizes, however, that the option purchaser should
be furnished information about writers' and endorsers' financial status.
97. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2, 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCIH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 4, 22,623 (1974). Rule 9b-2, in relevant part, states:
(a) Option Disclosure. It shall be unlawful for any broker.., to effect...
the purchase or sale of any option unless, at least 48 hours prior to execution
of such purchase or sale, the broker. . . has delivered or caused to be delivered
to the customer (A) a written statement which prominently includes material
setting forth the nature and extent of the obligations under, as well as the risks
attendant to, the purchase or sale of such options generally, or (B) a prospec-
tus . . ., and unless the broker. .. delivers thereafter any supplemental writ-
ten statement necessary to make current the disclosures . . . before effecting
any purchase or sale ....
(b) Option Suitability. No broker. . . shall recommend to any customer-
(1) any transaction in an option unless the broker. . . has reasonable grounds
to believe that the entire recommended transaction is not unsuitable . . . or
(2) the purchase of a [limited price option] . . . unless, in addition to com-
plying with the requirements of subparagraph (b) (1), the broker... obtains
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closure, specific suitability standards, and, with respect to endorsers,
accurate reporting and minimum net capital levels.98 In addition, the
Commission has proposed rule 238, which permits exemption from
options registration if the security offered meets certain well-deline-
ated conditions.99 The proposals effectuate the Commission's intent
to construct more restrictive guidelines for investor protection as well
as market efficiency.10 In a trading scheme fraught with high poten-
tial risks for unwary investors, the new standards respond to the two
main criticisms usually leveled at the current registration method-that
disclosure often reaches the investor after he has already committed
to purchase,101 and that he often does not understand the complexities
of disclosures.
10 2
1. Disclosure.-Proposed rule 9b-2(a) would expand brokers'
... from the customer such information ... as to have reasonable grounds
to believe... that the customer understands the special characteristics of such
option.
(c) Uncovered Calls and Offsetting Puts. No broker . . . shall effect ...
any transaction whereby such customer writes [an uncovered option] ... or
[an offsetting put] . . . unless, on the basis of information obtained by such
broker,. . . after reasonable inquiry,. . . he has a reasonable basis for believ-
ing that the customer. .. is capable of evaluating the additional risks in such
transactions, and has the financial capability to meet reasonably foreseeable
margin calls ....
(d) Reporting Requirement.
(1) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to endorse an option unless
such broker or dealer files reports ....
(2) Individual reports filed by... brokers... shall be considered nonpublic
information ....
(3) This paragraph (d) shall not apply to any option registered on a national
securities exchange.
(e) Net Capital Requirement. It shall be unlawful for any broker ... to en-
dorse . . . an option unless such broker ... has net capital ... of not less
than $50,000 ....
98. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9994 (Feb. 8, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg.
4994 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP. 79,221.
99. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5444 (Dec. 13, 1973), 39 Fed. Reg. 1283
(1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FaE. SEc. L. REP. 79,602; SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5366 (Feb. 8, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 4993 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FFa. SEC. L. REP. 79,222. The statutory basis for proposed rule 238
is Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970).
100. The SEC has taken a similarly protective position with regard to another secu-
rities field involving high risks for investors. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 11,125 (Dec. 9, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 44,520 (1974), [Current Binder] CCH FaD. S.-
L. Rap. 80,023 (warning to unscrupulous promoters and fraudulent schemes in the
opening of the gold market); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,158 (Dec. 31,
1974), 40 Fed. Reg. 1520 (1975), [Current Binder] CCH Fan. Sac. L. REP. If 80,039
(proposed rule 15c3-5 regulating the broker-customer relationship in gold trading).
101. See Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16
Bus. Aw. 300, 301-03 n.6 (1961).
102. See Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Pro-
tection, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 209-12 (1958).
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disclosure responsibilities by requiring that they furnish the customer,
not later than forty-eight hours prior to -the initial transaction, a written
statement explaining the nature and extent of the customer's obligation
and the risks involved in options trading. Previously, the Commission
required brokers to disclose risk information about the companies they
recommended for investment only when their own lack of essential in-
formation about the company engendered the risk.10 Recommenda-
tions about investment stocks conceivably brought to the broker-
customer relationship a special intimacy'0" that deserved the careful
scrutiny denied to options trading. The SEC also required that the
prospectuses of new issues registered under the Securities Act disclose
the risks implicit in speculative offerings. 10 Options that are not
traded on an exchange resemble new issues in that both are traded on
a primary market. The broker, who usually does not write options, in-
stead assumes the role of underwriter. Because the option resembles
a new issue, and the broker serves as its underwriter,10 6 options inves-
tors should, logically, acquire information similar to that available in
a new issue's prospectus. In the case of options traded on an exchange,
the broker would satisfy proposed rule 9b-2 (a) by supplying the client
with the option issuer's prospectus (e.g., the prospectus of the CBOECC)
before the forty-eight hour period."'
Proposed rule 9b-2(a) would, however, impose stricter standards
than does the present rule for new offerings. The Securities Act re-
quires that the prospectus only accompany or precede delivery of the
security;' 08 the requirement has lost all utility to situations in which the
buyer, relying on a broker's oral representations, commits himself to a
purchase before seeing the prospectus. 0 9 For disclosure to provide
customers with the opportunity to make informed investment deci-
103. See SEC v. North American Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir.
1970); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969).
104. See cases cited note 103 supra.
105. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 18,617
(1968), (1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEc. L. REP. 77,636; see Securities
Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970). See also Doman Helicopters, Inc., 41 S.E.C.
431, 439 & n.16 (1963).
106. Underwriters are liable for failing to disclose required information for new is-
sues. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2(11), 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(11), 77e (1970).
107. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. i 22,623 (1974).
108. Securities Act of 1933 § 5b(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2) (1970).
109. Jennings, supra note 102, at 210. Apparently, this mode of transaction repre-
sents the rule rather than the exception. See Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Fed-




sions,"l0 there must be adequate time for deliberation; accordingly,
some commentators have favored requiring disclosure at least forty-
eight hours prior to purchase."1  The SEC has not demanded prepur-
chase disclosure for transactions involving new stock issues," 2 but the
complexities of options markets and the potential for abuse will likely
move the Commission to adopt such a requirement for the options trad-
ing scheme." 3 Furthermore, the classic arguments against prepur-
chase disclosure lose force when applied to options trading. First, the
disclosure requirement would not always hamper options trade spon-
taneity,"' because proposed rule 9b-2(a) applies only to the custom-
er's initial transaction. If the broker anticipates timed trading,"5 he
may furnish blanket disclosures for all or some of his clientele; the dis-
closure requirement would then impede timed trading only when new
customers enter the market. Second, the cost should not be prohibi-
tive," because the broker need only provide one full disclosure to each
customer, and subsequent sales would merely necessitate an updating
of information."1
7
The effectiveness of proposed rule 9b-2(a) will depend upon the
solution of several potential problems. To avoid delays in timed sales
and simultaneously to reduce disclosure costs, the broker might provide
only one explanatory prospectus, notwithstanding proposed rule 9b-2
(a)(B)," 8s which arguably requires a prospectus for each exchange li-
censed to issue options-at present, two (one for the CBOE and one
110. See In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947); Anderson, supra note 109, at
312 & n.4.
111. See, e.g., Pringle, Summary Prospectus Proposal of Midwest Securities Commis-
sioners Association, 23 Bus. LAw. 567, 569 (1968).
112. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.434a (1974); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4968 (April
24, 1969), 34 Fed. Reg. 7235 (1969), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1 77,685 (preliminary prospectus received forty-eight hours before the mailing of
the confirmation of sales); cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (1974); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5397 (June 1, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Rl-'. 79,385
(stock-offering circulars governed by a forty-eight-hour requirement).
113. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9994 (Feb. 8, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 4994 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FuD. SEc. L. RaP. 79,221.
114. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,550 (Dec. 13, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 35,334 (1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 79,601;
Pringle, supra note 111, at 568.
115. In timed sales the investor's profit depends upon the broker's executing the order
at the proper time. Such an investor might lose a portion of that hoped-for profit on
his initial trade if he must wait forty-eight hours before the broker may execute his
order.
116. Pringle, supra note 111, at 568.
117. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED.
Sac. L. REP. I 22,623 (1974).
118. Id. § 240.9b-2(a) (B).
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for the American Stock Exchange) and, foreseeably, several others.
Alternatively, brokers may disclose information on "the purchase...
of such options generally,"" 9 which suggests that one prospectus would
suffice, an interpretation more desirable in light of both delay and cost
objections. Furthermore, the complexity and potential abuse of op-
tions trading actually necessitates disclosure, not the fiscal strength of
the exchange's clearing corporation. The prospectus of any one ex-
change, therefore, should apprise the customer of the nature and risks
of options trading, and the broker should supply needed financial data
about the exchange's clearing corporation in the conventional manner,
upon delivery of the securities. 120
The proposed rule also permits the broker to deliver supplemental
material after the beginning of the forty-eight-hour period and before
the purchase.'' Apparently, nothing prevents him from furnishing an
essentially useless statement, followed, at the time of purchase, by a
more informative supplement-a procedure that would deny the cus-
tomer an adequate inspection and would, in effect, render the proposed
rule self-defeating.' 2 To sidestep this loophole requires interpreting
"supplemental written statement" to include all information acquired
by the broker after delivery of the initial disclosure statement, neces-
sarily excluding any information already known to the broker at the
time of the initial delivery. Still, the proposed 9b-2(a) requires only
that the broker have "delivered or caused to be delivered to the cus-
tomer" the disclosure statement in advance of the forty-eight-hour
period.'23 Conceivably, the broker might orally explain the risks to the
customer, and then mail the statement and execute a sale after waiting
forty-eight hours, so that the customer might receive the statement after
any usefulness had waned-a result that obviously clashes with the aim
of the proposed rule.' The Commission could avoid this hazard by
interpreting the delivery phrase to require that the customer actually
119. Id. § 240.9b-2(a) (A).
120. The CBOE's informative prospectus will probably serve as the model for other
exchanges' prospectuses. 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAw § 2.21[6], at 2-58.10 (1975).
121. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 22,623 (1974).
122. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,550 (Dec. 13, 1973), 38 Fed.
Reg. 35,334 (1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RP. If 79,601.
123. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 22,623 (1974).
124. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,550 (Dec. 13, 1973), 38 Fed.




receive the statement no later than forty-eight hours prior to the pur-
chase.'12  The proposed disclosure requirement, in its present form,
although intended to guarantee customers the prepurchase information
necessary for a knowledgeable investment decision, may have no pro-
tective effects in the important context of an investor's first transaction.
The proposed rule presents a final problem: the customer may
neither read nor understand the statement. 126  Options trading can
attract small investors because options are available for a small per-
centage of the underlying stock's price. Many of these purchasers
may not fully comprehend options complexities. Nevertheless, im-
position of disclosure standards on options transactions might prove
as ineffectual a remedy as have such standards for new offerings.
The effectiveness of the disclosure rule, therefore, will depend on
another section of the proposed regulation, its suitability rule, 127 which
purports to assure that the broker will actually impart an understanding
of options mechanics to his customer.
2. Suitability.-The first SEC suitability rule applicable to all
types of securities, rule 15b10-3, 8 was adopted in 1967.2 In 1974
the SEC promulgated an alternative suitability rule, emphasizing the in-
vestor's capacity to evaluate a specific investment.' 30  The general suit-
ability rule requires that, before recommending a transaction, the broker
must have a reasonable basis to believe, after inquiry, that the transaction
will not inordinately drain the client's financial resources.'31 The pro-
125. Rule 256, which requires forty-eight-hour notice of an offering circular, does
require receipt by the customer before the forty-eight-hour period. 17 C.F.R. § 230.256
(a) (2) (1974). Because the substantially different wording in rule 256 may warrant
a different interpretation of proposed rule 9b-2(a), cI. Dickenson v. Fletcher, L.R. 9
C.P. 1, 7-8 (1873) (change in language of subsequent statute in pari materia creates
different meaning), the SEC should revise proposed rule 9b-2(a) so that it requires ac-
tual receipt of a prospectus by the customer.
126. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171-72
(1933).
127. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 22,623 (1974).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1974).
129. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135 (July 27, 1967), 32 Fed. Reg.
11,637 (1967), [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,459.
130. SEC Reg. § 230.146(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974), 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
2710 (1974).
131. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(b)-(c), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. [ 22,623 (1974). The suitability rule in other areas of law requires
an express representation that the transaction suits the client's needs. See Anderson v.
Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962) (sale of in-
surance). In the securities industry, however, such a representation inheres in the
broker-customer relationship. E. WEiss, REGIS-mATiON AND REGuLATION Op BROKERS
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posed suitability rule includes two modifications 32 with respect to two
kinds of options-the limited price option, which expires before the
term if the price of the underlying stock reaches a certain level, and
the uncovered, or "naked," option, which permits the writer to forego
purchasing the underlying stock and exposes both writer and endorser
to an unlimited loss. The proposed rule would require that, upon rec-
ommending a trade in a limited price option, the broker must have
reasonable grounds for believing that the customer understands its
mechanics.3 3  The broker dealing in uncovered options must also
reasonably conclude that his customer can evaluate the risks and bear
the loss, regardless of any broker recommendations. 3 4
Despite their paternalistic purpose, sections (b) and (c) of pro-
posed rule 9b-2 suffer from the failure to provide standards for determin-
ing what constitutes reasonable grounds for belief that the customer
either understands or has the capacity to evaluate. The limited-price op-
tion requirement, for example, neglects to explain the appropriate test for
determining a customer's level of expertise. Neither by merely asking
the customer whether he understands the mechanics nor by orally ex-
plaining limited options to him can the broker objectively ascertain that
the customer does, in fact, comprehend. An oral presentation could
also present subsequent evidentiary problems should the customer con-
veniently fail to remember its salience. On the other hand, a more
definite method, such as an oral or written test, might offend the cus-
AND DEALERS 184-85 (1965). The National Association of Securities Dealers, a self-
regulatory, private association of brokers organized under section 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1970), has long enforced a suitability re-
quirement based solely upon the personal financial information supplied by the client.
Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 227 (1960). Some federal courts, however, have refused
to enforce the NASD rule, holding, instead, that its violation would not engender federal
civil liability, but may, when asserted under a federal court's pendent jurisdiction, consti-
tute evidence in support of a common law claim of negligence or breach of fiduciary
duty. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970);
Mercury Investment Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Tex.
1969). See also Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690,
700-01, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 232-33 (Ct. App. 1968).
132. Compare Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(b)-(c), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973),
2 CCH FED' SEc. L. REP. I 22,623 (1974), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1974).
There are two minor differences between rule 15b10-3 and proposed rule 9b-2(b): first,
by omission of the word "security" rule 9b-2(b) avoids interpreting whether a put quali-
fies as a security; and second, unlike rule 15b10-3, proposed rule 9b-2(b) applies to all
brokers and dealers, not just nonmembers of the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers.
133. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED.
SEc. L. RP. V 22,623 (1974).




tomer. Rule 146(d),135 the suitability standard for private offerings,
requires only that the broker determine the customer's ability to evalu-
ate the risk or bear the loss. Accordingly, a nonoptions broker may
limit his inquiry to easily verifiable financial records and eschew the
subjective considerations. In uncovered options writing, the SEC
would require the broker to investigate further into subjective charac-
teristics. Administrative or judicial formulation of a uniform standard
for rating investors' comprehension should alleviate many suitability
problems for brokers.
3. Reporting and Capital Requirements.-The remainder of
proposed rule 9b-2 addresses reporting and net capital requirements.135
Under proposed rule 9b-2(e), a broker who endorses an option must
maintain a net capitalization of $50,000.'7 Failure to comply with the
net capital requirement would result in suspension 3 or revocation 30
of the broker's registration. This provision, although similar to rule
15c3-1, 140 effectively comprehends the special risks of options trading.
Proposed rule 9b-2(d)' 4 1 would aid in enforcing the net capital re-
quirement by compelling the broker to report weekly the number and
kind of options he endorses and report monthly his total number of un-
exercised options. From the SEC's standpoint, strict adherence to the
reporting requirements is essential to the protection of investors;' 42
accordingly, falsification of records carries a severe penalty, the revoca-
135. SEC Reg. § 230.146(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1973), 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
2710 (1974).
136. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(d)-(e), 38 Fed. Reg. 35.334 (1973), 2 CCH
FPD. Sac. L. REP. 22,623 (1974).
137. The $50,000 capital requirement provides a drawing fund for the option holder
should he choose to exercise the option.
138. Cf. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9416 (Dec. 13, 1971),
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. V 78,468 (rule 15c3-1 net capital
requirement).
139. See Blaise D'Antoni & Assoc., Inc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961).
140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (a) (4) (1974). The rule requires a minimum $2,500
in net capital, and permits a 2000% indebtedness for brokers and dealers who meet spec-
ified conditions. Rule 15c3-1(b)(2) exempts brokers who deal on the six named ex-
changes that employ a net capital requirement in excess of that contemplated by the rule.
The CBOE is one such exchange. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9988 (Feb.
2, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 4315 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
RaP. I 79,213. The statutory basis for proposed rule 9b-2(e) is the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 §§ 9(b), 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b), 78o(c)(3) (1970).
141. The statutory basis for proposed rule 9b-2(d) is Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §§ 9(b), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b), 78q(a) (1970).
142. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9468 (Jan. 27, 1972), [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. V 78,498.
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tion of registration. 143  A customer may invoke proposed rule 9b-2 as
a basis for imposing civil liability upon the broker. Prior decisions
4 4
held that civil liability could not depend on section 9b, because it only
prohibited options transactions conducted "in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.'
45
4. Exemptions.-To relieve somewhat the issuers' burden in
options registration, the SEC has considered adopting an exemption that
would eliminate options registration and reduce unnecessary costs in
those cases involving suitably protected investors. Because most of the
registration information elicited by the purchaser deals with the nature
of transaction risks and endorsers' finances, proposed rule 9b-2, by al-
ready requiring these disclosures, offers the ideal justification for an ex-
emption. Proposed rule 238 permits exemption from registering
options, other than limited price options, 146 if (1) the issuer of the un-
derlying stock satisfies the reporting requirements; 47 (2) the issuer of
the underlying security registers the securities; (3) the options issuer
does not also issue the underlying stock; (4) the endorser is a
registered dealer; and (5) the gross sales aggregate of all "related op-
tions" does not exceed $500,000. The SEC defines "related options"
as an underlying stock's total number of either puts or calls that expire
in the same month. Thus, for purposes of proposed rule 238, a put
would not be "related" to a call: puts and calls would be considered
separately.
Proposed rule 238 promises several effects. The SEC's definition
of "issuers" as including both options writers and endorsers would
143. See In re Leo G. MacLaughlin Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7783 (Jan. 5, 1966), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. f 77,317;
In re Woods & Co., 41 S.E.C. 725 (1963).
144. Wolfson v. Parkway Management Co., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn.
SEc. L. REP. 91,967, at 96,294 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Subsequent option traders have
failed to establish a 9b cause of action in the absence of relevant rule.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970).
146. The original proposed rule 238 also exempted limited price options. SEC Secu-
rities Act Release No. 5366 (Feb. 8, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 4993 (1973), [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 79,222. The SEC considers them so spec-
ulative, however, that exemption from the disclosure requirements is not warranted. As
a result, limited price options will probably disappear. See Frankhauser, Options Regu-
lation, 7 Rav. OF SEC. REGULATION 887, 888 (1974).
147. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d)
(1970). The CBOE is exempt from the reporting requirements. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 10,483 (Nov. 7, 1973); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5444
(Dec. 13, 1973), 39 Fed. Reg. 1283 (1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.





appear to restrict the number of writers per endorser and the number
of endorsers per writer, because aggregate sales must not exceed the
rule's limit. This apparent ceiling on the permissible number of en-
dorsers and writers is probably artificial, however, inasmuch as small
premiums permit enormous trade volumes before reaching the
$500,000 gross sales level. The proposed rule's requirement that a
registered dealer endorse the option to qualify it for exemption might
destroy the over-the-counter options market by inducing dealers to en-
dorse the more stable exchange options. 148 The collapse of the over-
the-counter market might not seriously affect total options market
volume, but it would severely limit the number of stocks represented by
exchange options. On balance, however, the rule 238 exemption would
likely remove needless restrictions from some options transactions and
generally expedite registration procedures. Because an issuer must
register on the exchange that trades his security,149 rule 238 also raises
the possibility of double registration. Without an exemption, the SEC
would probably compel an exchange to register both the options and
the underlying security, because the issuer, for example, the CBOECC, is
also the vehicle through which purchasers exercise options.'5 0 An
amendment to rule 12a-6,' 5 ' directed especially at options exchanges,
exempts the underlying security in situations in which (1) the issuer regis-
ters the option, (2) the exchange deals in the underlying stock only when
exercising the option, and (3) the issuer of the underlying stock has
registered it elsewhere. This rule effectively eliminates all exchange
double registration problems.
IV. Margin Requirements
Although the SEC regulates the securities industry to protect the
investor, Congress authorized the FRB to regulate the amount of credit
that a lender may extend for securities trading, 5 2 to prevent a misal-
location of the nation's credit resources into a speculative securities
market.'53 The FRB has adopted several rules' 54 regulating margin,
148. See Frankhauser, supra note 146.
149. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1970).
150. Prospectus, supra note 15, at 22-26.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-6 (1974); see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
10,123 (April 26, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 11,448 (1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. I 79,354.
152. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970).
153. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECURITIES EXCHANGE
BIL OF 1934, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934).
154. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1975), governs credit extended by brokers; Reg-
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a credit device that enables customers to purchase securities for a per-
centage of the purchase price. By means of this "down payment," the
purchaser becomes equitable owner of the security, which remains in
the lender's possession. The borrower never pledges payment of the
balance; instead he must continue to match fluctuations in the "down
payment" percentage caused by FRB rule changes.155 The purchaser
also must pay interest on the amount of the purchase price balance bor-
rowed from his broker, but he need not pay the principal unless he
desires physical possession of the shares. 15 6 Under Regulation T, the
customer may have two accounts-a general, or margin, account, 57 and
a special, or nonmargin, account.1 8  Registered and exempt securities
in the general account have a loan value based on a percentage of their
current market value. The customer must maintain sufficient cash and
loan value in the general account to cover the "down payment" on his
margin securities. Unavoidably, loan value may sink below the proper
level because of the effect of market fluctuations on the value of securi-
ties in the general account. Accordingly, failure to restore the "down
payment" level within five business days after notification by a margin
call'59 authorizes the broker to sell sufficient securities in the general
account to restore compliance with the margin requirement.8 0 In con-
trast, the special account enables the broker to extend credit on the
security's full purchase price for seven business days, after which the
customer must pay the full purchase price.
161
The FRB recently listed four limitations on the use of options in
the margin context: 6 2 options have no loan value; they are not
unissued securities; they may not serve as exchangeable securities in
short sales; and they may not be used for arbitrage. Through these
rulings the Board effectively discriminates between options and other
ulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1975), governs credit extended by banks; and Regulation
G, 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1975), governs credit extended by other lenders.
155. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3 (1975).
156. Id. § 220.3b-2.
157. Id. § 220.3.
158. Id. § 220.4.
159. A margin call notifies the customer that the loan value of his general account
has less value than the current FRB margin requirement for the shares he bought on
margin.
160. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3e (1975).
161. A customer who attempts to use the special account to avoid the margin require-
ment by buying and selling the stock within the seven-day period without depositing the
full purchase price may not again use his special account for ninety days. 12 C.F.R.
§ 220.4c8 (1975).




securities and unfortunately misses an opportunity to appraise options
in margin accounts on an experimental basis.
A. Loan Value
The FRB, acting to prevent speculation leading to a volatile
options market or to a disruption of the underlying securities market,163
determined that puts and calls have no loan value.164 The old margin
requirements emphasized that loan value could derive only from
exempt and registered securities, 65 in addition to any over-the-counter
securities approved by the FRB.Y6 Before the birth of the CBOE, puts
and calls fell outside this category. CBOE options, however, are reg-
istered securities and merit loan value like any other security.""° The
FRB's disparate treatment of options may evolve from the possibility
that exchange options would generate double leverage if assigned loan
value. Even without the margin benefit, options procure the specula-
tive use of the underlying stock at a cost much less than that required
for an investment in the stock itself. If options were marginable, an
even smaller capital outlay would generate profit or loss on the underly-
ing stock's price fluctuations. Double leverage would undoubtedly
attract investors and make exchanges more attractive to the large insti-
tutions that generally disdain options writing because of the small
volume. On the other hand, the FRB does not favor extending credit
163. See Gates, supra note 2, at 457.
164. 59 FED. REsERvE BuLL. 448-49 (1973); Regulation G, 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(a)
(1975); Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.8(f) (1975); Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.4
(a) (1975). The FRB's authority over credit for securities extended by banks stems
from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1970), which
grants power only over "equity securities," as defined in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970). The FRB had doubted whether
options were "equity securities." In light of the emergence of the CBOE, the SEC clari-
fied the issue by amending rule 3all-1 to include puts and calls within the definition
of "equity security," to emphasize that the FRB had power to regulate the extension of
options credit by banks. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1974); SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 10,129 (April 27, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 11,449 (1973), [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 79,356; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
9929 (Jan. 29, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 3339 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD.
SEc. L. REP. 179,196.
165. See 59 FED. RESERVE BULL. 448 (1973).
166. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(e) (1975).
167. See Gates, supra note 2, at 456. CBOE options clearly come within the defini-
tion of "equity security." See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a) (11), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(11) (1970); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9929 (Jan. 29, 1973),
38 Fed. Reg. 3339 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
79,196. Regulation T adopts this definition, 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(h) n.2 (1975), and
includes these securities within the general account, 12 C.F.R. § 220.3 (a) (1975).
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to foster speculation. The Board has acted in the past to restrict specu-
lation,0 8 and the speculation precipitated by the novelty of an options
market may subside in part because of the FRB's refusal to attach loan
value to options.
The decision to deny loan value was unwise in that it represents
an inconsistent application of a possibly unjustifiable proscription. The
FRB cannot convincingly support its claim that buying options on mar-
gin affects the volatility of the options market' 69 or the underlying se-
curities market. 170  The CBOE's experimental stage posed the ideal
opportunity for testing the effects of buying options on margin; at
present, the volume, the number of investors, and the number of under-
lying stocks are all relatively small, so that any double leverage adver-
sities have little long-range effect. Arguably, the FRB and the SEC
have both decided to exclude margin considerations from the options
experiment in order to assure more accurate experimental results. At
any rate, the deficiencies caused by administrative failure to estimate
economic effects properly are not irreparable, and the FRB can still
reconsider and permit options purchases on margin.
The FRB decision to deny loan value to options, however,
registers unfavorably for another reason. The no-loan policy logically
conflicts with the FRB's treatment of listed warrants-the rights issued
by a corporation to acquire its securities 7M-that the FRB interprets
as having loan value.' 72  Exchange calls will probably play no greater
part in generating speculative fever than listed warrants, even though
there are many more calls than warrants to trade. Furthermore, puts
168. See 48 FED. REsERVE BULL. 840 (1962).
169. The commodity futures market treats the "underlying security" as a commodity;
otherwise it evinces the same characteristics and volatility as the options market. In
the futures market, however, the customer actually buys or sells the commodity for
future delivery. The commodity broker may, without FRB interference, extend credit
to his customer. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4d(2), 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1970); 17
C.F.R. § 1.30 (1974). Puts and calls of futures are forbidden. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 402 (Oct. 23, 1974), amending
7 U.S.C. § 6c (1970).
170. Some listed warrants, and select over-the-counter warrants, both of which re-
semble call options (except that they are usually of longer duration), may be purchased
on margin accounts. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c)(3) (1975); 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
22,210, at 16,109 (1974). No disruptive effects have been traced to double leverage.
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-4(a)(1) (1974). See also Miller v. General Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co., 223 F. Supp. 790, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-4(a) (1)
(1974).
172. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c) (3) (1975).
It must be noted, however, that the period during which warrants may be exercised
is typically much longer than the time usually allowed for options. Warrants are there-




and calls are the only specific type of security lacking loan value in a
general account.1'73 From the viewpoint of an options customer who
wishes only to invest in the secondary options market and not exercise
the option,17 4 little difference exists between an exchange's option and
any other security, aside from the option's smaller price. Because most
options traders invest on a small scale, 175 the FRB's discrimination be-
tween options traders and traders of other securities favors the wealthy.
Although the rule may succeed in limiting the losses of small traders
who succumb to ill-advised gambling, margin calls provide a better and
less restrictive method. The Board has found no evidence that an infu-
sion of numerous small investors-lured into the market by the
prospects of double leverage-will increase speculative fever. Con-
ceivably, the Board is keying on the inability of some customers to pay
the option's price upon expiration. Margin calls eliminate potential
damage caused by defaulting customers, inasmuch as brokers may sell
the options while the account's value level sufficiently covers the obliga-
tions. Because the FRB allows customers to buy the options through
a special account,176 essentially an extension of short-term credit, the
Board apparently does not view customer default as a primary concern.
Accordingly, no justification emerges for the Board's interdictory policy,
which amounts to an unauthorized encroachment on the SEC's province
of protecting investors.
B. Unissued Securities
The Board has also determined that an option is not an unissued
security. The payment period-seven business days for a special
account--does not commence until after the writer issues the secu-
rity. 77 For the first sale of an exchange option, the option may be tech-
nically unissued because writing precedes issuance. A few days' delay
is common. The FRB demurred from extending the credit period on
the basis of such a technicality,17 ruling that puts and calls do not qual-
ify as unissued securitiesY.9  Though probably beneficent, the Board's
173. 12 C.F.R. § 220.8(f) (1975).
174. The majority of option traders do not intend to exercise their options. Wax,
SEC Focused Anew on Options Trading, 219 CoM. & FINANcrAL CHRONICLE, Jan. 28,
1974, at 2, col. 2.
175. See Berton, supra note 1, at 25.
176. 12 C.F.R. § 220.126(b) (1975).
177. Id. § 220.4(c) (3).
178. See id. § 220.118 (mutual funds).
179. Id. § 220.126(c).
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rationale lacks clarity. It may indeed prove difficult to ascertain the
beginning of the seven-day period, but the determination seems irrele-
vant. The FRB can discipline a customer who takes advantage of issu-
ance delay and violates the margin rules by withdrawing from the trans-
action before the end of the period by imposing a ninety-day freeze
on the customer's account.180  The FRB may have formulated the rule
to protect its no-loan provisions: if options were treated as unissued
securities, options investors could obtain short-term credit over a long
and indefinite period and effectively bypass the no-loan rule. Further-
more, the FRB customarily denies credit usages in primary markets,
which deal exclusively in unissued securities.' 8 ' The options market,
however, presented the curious admixture of both issued and unissued
securities, in response to which the Board elected to abjure the sec-
ondary characteristics in favor of treating options exclusively as a
primary market that traded solely in unissued securities. In the hybrid
options market it is more difficult to determine whether a particular
customer's option is new, issued, or unissued. The FRB's refusal to
classify options as unissued securities, therefore, effectively liberates
brokers and the clearing corporation from plaguing technical dis-
tinctions.1
82
C. Exchangeable Securities in Short Sales
The FRB decided that calls do not qualify as securities, at least
in the same sense that some securities may be exchanged for other se-
curities in margin accounts for short sales. 183 The broker may, on gen-
eral account, accept exchangeable securities, including warrants, in lieu
of the margin requirement for short sales, 8 4 inasmuch as these securi-
ties entitle the holder to the same type of securities as those sold by
the short seller. The FRB's position again differs from its stance on
warrants. The use of calls rather than securities-e.g., in "against the
box" trades, when the sale and purchase of the same type of 'securi-
ties are not cancelled out-requires a much smaller cash commitment
and of course extends leverage. Consequently, a ruling that calls are
not exchangeable securities apparently furthers the FRB's stated pur-
180. See id. § 220.4(c)(8).
181. See id. § 220.118.
182. In exercising an option, the CBOECC selects a writer at random. Prospectus,
supra note 15, at 8.
183. 12C.F.R. § 220.126(d)-(e) (1975).




pose, preventing traders on the short side from exerting more influence
than traders on the long side for the same amount of funds.'"" Permit-
ting investors to use warrants as exchangeable securities, however, runs
counter to the treatment of options, and the FRB should have extended
the benefits to both warrants and calls. Identifying warrants as
exchangeable securities might suggest that the FRB intends the rule
as a guarantee that the short sale will be covered, except that both
warrants and calls already serve that purpose. The real aim of the rule
must be to foreclose options' loan value.
D. Arbitrage
The FRB prohibits the use of options for arbitrage. The arbitrage
rule-as it relates to a given security, or its counterpart, if convertible
within ninety days-allows the purchase of the security in one market,
and the sale in another market, without necessitating additional margin
payments.'" 6 Ideally, the rule enables a customer to take better ad-
vantage of price differentials on the two exchanges. Frequent use of
arbitrage thus stabilizes the price18 7 by fostering uniformity among the
various exchanges. Read literally, the rule could apply to options, but
the FRB has dictated differently, 8  reasoning instead that options cus-
tomers would use the procedure as a device for hedging, 89 and that
any benefits would accrue solely to individual investors, not to the
market as a whole.196 Again, however, the FRB permits the customer
to use warrants for hedging and arbitrage purposes.' 9 ' Furthermore,
the arbitrage technique would carry limited utility in the underlying
185. 12 C.F.R. § 220.126(e) (1975). The FRB surmises that subjecting both long
and short transactions to the same rules would create a market decline. Consequently,
in an attempt to impede short selling and encourage buying long, the Board has imposed
various restrictions, such as permitting short sales only in a market in which the last
sale was for a price higher than the preceding sale.
186. Id. Ordinarily, such a transaction involves a purchase on one exchange and a
short sale on the other. Without the rule, a customer would have to fulfill the margin
requirements at both exchanges; under the rule, he need only sustain the margin require-
ment for one transaction and need not provide additional funds to match the margin
requirement at the other exchange.
187. 12 C.F.RL § 220.126(f) (1974).
188. Id.
189. Hedging is a trading strategy designed to yield income regardless of the direction
of market fluctuations. For example, if a shareholder suspects the market will rise, he
purchases a put at the current striking price.' If the stock appreciates, he lets the put
expire and sells the stock. If the price falls, he exercises the put. The cost of this flexi-
bility is the price of the premium.
190. 12 C.F.RL § 220.126(f) (1975).
191. Id. § 220.4(d).
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market: unless the premium were less than the difference between the
striking price and the current market price, which is uncommon, the
increased premium expense would discourage many investors, inas-
much as trading in the underlying security would involve less expense.
Arbitrage in options trading would clearly stabilize options prices; op-
tions arbitrage thus serve a legitimate function in the options market.
Moreover, the investor cannot use the technique to evade margin
requirements because, in taking advantage of the price differential, the
two transactions would always cancel. The customer can succeed in




Recently the securities regulatory agencies have initiated vigorous
implementation of the congressional mandate to protect the public and
the economy. The resulting paternalism has manifested itself in
numerous recent securities developments. Two circumstances have
equipped the options market as the most suitable laboratory for testing
the SEC's newest ideas in experimental reform: the market probably
needs the SEC's guardianship, and, additionally, options trading is so
new that resistance to the SEC's intermeddling is somewhat unorgan-
ized and underfinanced. Most SEC activity has been designed to pro-
tect investors, only the most knowledgeable of whom are commonly
able to trade options to their own advantage. The SEC adopted rule
9b-1 so that the Commission could properly supervise formulation of
options exchanges' rules, then declared that options qualify as securities
so that disclosure would accompany options registration and, finally,
proposed rule 9b-2 so that prospective purchasers would know, in
advance, about certain dangers in options trading. Meanwhile, the
FRB peremptorily withdrew options from the credit market by prevent-
ing their use in margin accounts and likewise withdrew options from
the securities market by disallowing their use in covering short sales
and arbitrage.
In its haste to protect investors, the SEC drafted an options regula-
tion plan containing several faults. First, rule 9b-l fails clearly to vest
the SEC with proper authority to initiate rule changes subsequent to
its approval of an exchange's initial trading plan. The rule's language




might create loopholes that leave the SEC powerless to intervene
with the spontaneity necessary to monitor its experimental reg-
ulatory scheme effectively: as a condition to SEC supervision of the
approved plan, the rule may instead require affirmative exchange
action in amending its initial plan. Second, proposed rule 9b-2 fails
to guarantee needed risk disclosure to the customer before he commits
himself to the trade. An unscrupulous broker may disclose scanty in-
formation before the beginning of the forty-eight-hour period and
reveal the required balance of information in a supplemental statement
issued at the latest possible moment, when the customer has no oppor-
tunity to benefit from the disclosure. Third, proposed rule 9b-2 would
not arm the broker with a clear standard for determining whether an
options trade is suitable. The broker must ascertain whether the cus-
tomer understands the options trade, but the standard of reasonable-
ness is vague and may necessitate judicial clarification.
The SEC's new rules suggest that the agency may view the options
market as a proving ground for untried theories of exchange regulation
and investor protection. By intruding into a market conspicuously lack-
ing powerful, entrenched interests, the SEC perhaps is calculating the
precedential leverage that will facilitate later incursions into the securi-
ties industry. The SEC may anticipate applying its investor-protection
latitude to a wide variety of securities fields. The SEC desires not only
that brokers provide information to customers, but also that they pro-
vide the information in such a manner that it is instructive to customers
before they make trading decisions. Congress likewise intended this
effect, but the securities industry has successfully forestalled any SEC
move to effectuate the congressional policy on the basis that the dis-
closure requirement should not inhibit timed trading. The options
market might present the SEC's ideal context for testing the disclosure
requirement's feasibility before applying it in other securities areas.
To meet Congress' mandate of protecting investors, the SEC has aug-
mented its previous disclosure requirements by requiring that investors
must also be capable of evaluating the supplied information. In
addition, for especially risky options transactions, the SEC will experi-
ment with a rule requiring that the investor actually understand before
he trades. If the experiment succeeds and does not inhibit trading,
the SEC may extend the requirement to its other suitability rules. Al-
though the SEC's role is undeniably paternalistic, the Commission has
refused to protect investors to the extent of banning all options trading.
rus'ead, to encourage the steady growth of options trading and create
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a healthy ambience for investors, the Commission maintains appropri-
ate safeguards and, at the same time, preserves the high profit yield
of options leverage.
In contrast with the SEC's flexibility, the FRB has responded to
options with rigid prohibitions. Rather than drafting thoughtful, pro-
tective devices to make certain the proper use of options in margin
accounts, the Board has favored a sophistical interpretation that calls
are not securities, even though warrants, essentially similar to calls,
are securities. Similarly, the FRB has excluded the call from covering
short trades and arbitrage maneuvers, although it has not rejected
similar uses of warrants. Hopefully the Board will eventually recon-
sider the Regulation T options philosophy, an unlucky provision that
runs counter to the SEC's recent strides in regulating options. The
same iwo considerations that urged SEC action, both of which reflected
the need to generate revenue during the recent, depressed economic
period, may also activate the FRB. First, the brokerage industry
needed increased revenue from commissions on trades. Extensive op-
tions trading practically guarantees commission revenue to the broker-
age industry by offering high returns to investors at a low capital outlay
and thereby attracting an increased and varied clientele that would not
ordinarily trade in conventional securities. Second, high-volume trad-
ing encourages options writing by large institutional investors in need
of additional revenue to offset low dividends and portfolio losses. By
isolating new traders from effective credit channels, the FRB has with-
drawn a large portion of the market's business and partially thwarted
the efforts of the SEC. Options deserve treatment appropriate to
modem investment times, including carefully scrutinized incorporation
into margin accounts, and use of short sales and arbitrage procedures.
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